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ABSTRACT
This paper applies a numerical optimizationtechnique using microunit tax
data to the problem of choosing theparameters of a flat—rate tax system, should
one be desired. Our approach is to first formulate explicit objectives that
a flat—rate tax might reasonably be designed to meet, such asminimizing the
extent of changes in households' tax burdens and minimizing theefficiency
cost of the tax system. The next step uses an optimizationalgorithm to
calculate the flat—rate schedule which comes closest tomeeting the objectives,
subject to the constraint that it raise the same revenue as the current income
tax system. The calculations are carried out using a sample of 947tax returns
randomly drawn from the Treasury Tax File for 1977 which are updated torepro-
duce the pattern of tax returns that would be filed in 1982.
The analysis shows that the flat—rate system which minimizes thesum of
the absolute deviations in tax liabilities featuresa marginal tax rate
between 0.204 and 0.254, though a different definition of tax burdenchanges
which puts more emphasis on reproducing the tax burdens of high—income
households has an optimal marginal tax rate of 0.382. We also derive the
optimal flat—rate schedules when another objective is to minimize the effi-
ciency cost of the tax system.
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This paper is an exercise in applied optimal tax reform.It
applies a numerical Optimization technique using microunit tax
data to the problem of choosing a flat—rate income taxsystem,
should one be desired. Although analytic models of theoptimal
linear income tax system abound in the literature1, these models
make simplifying assumptions about the distribution of income and
do not consider the distribution of thearray of potential deduc-
tions and exclusions that exist in the current U.S. income tax
system. The virtue of the optimization technique, first intro-
duced by Yitzhaki (1982, 1983) is that it can solvea much more
general problem using more realistic and detailed information
about incomes and the tax system. This research is an exercise in
optimal tax reform rather than optimal tax design because we main-
tain the assumption that one of the desirable characteristics ofa
flat—rate system is a minimum of change in the existing distribu-
tion of tax burdens.2
The essence of the flat—rate taxis simple. Each taxpaying
unit is allowed some level of exemption, probably associated with
the number of persons in the unit, and perhaps dependent on the
age or marital status of the unit. Income above the exemption
level is subject to a cnstant tax rate. Although recent flat—rate
tax proposals differ with regard to the extent to which deductions
from gross incomein addition to the exemption level mentioned
above will be permitted, they all tend to reduce the number of
deductions from what is currently allowed.
Our goal here is not to assess the desirability of substi-
tuting a flat—rate income tax for the present tax system. Rather,
our more limited objective is to shed light on some of the issues
involved in choosing the rate structure of a flat—rate tax system,
should one be desired. This is not a trivial question since an
infinite number of different flat—rate tax systems can be
constructed which will yield the same amount of total revenue.
There are three aspects which can be altered: (i) the level of
personal exemptions, (ii) the (constant) marginal tax rate and—2—
(iii) the extent of deductions from taxable income allowed. The
lower is the exemption level and the extent of deductions allowed,
the lower is the marginal tax rate that is needed to raise a given
amount of total revenue.It is the tradeoff between these aspects
of a flat—rate tax that will be explored here.
Although our purpose is not to assess the merits of aflat—
rate tax system, nevertheless it will be helpful fordiscrimi-
nating among alternative systems to briefly discuss theissues
that have been raised in connection with moving to such a system.
These issues may be grouped into three categories:administra—
tivefcompliance costs, efficiency/incentive effects, and the
distribution of tax burdens.
It has been argued that a flat—rate tax would be simpler
for the government to administer and less costly for taxpayersto
comply with. Even if the often—heard claim thatthe tax form
could fit on a postcard is not true, a significant decreasein
administrative and compliance costs could be expected to the
extent that the range of exclusions, deductions,and credits is
reduced. The cost savings do not seem to be related tothe rate
schedule itself, as this is a small step in the calculationof tax
liability.
To the extent that a flat—rate tax system is accompanied bya
lover marginal tax rate, it is argued that therewill be increased
work effort and saving, as well as less activity in the
underground (untaxed) economy and tax shelter investmentswhich
are desirable only because of their peculiar taxtreatment. One
must be careful here, though, because as will beclear later in
this paper, many flat—rate tax plans entail increased marginaltax
rates for middle—income individuals. In this case,incentive
effects at the ends of the income scale must be balancedagainst
disincentive effects at the middle.
Changing to a flat—rate tax system would cause some
households' tax burdens to rise, and others' to fall. Whowould
gain and who would lose would depend on the particularflat—rate
system chosen, the household's incomelevel and the extent to
which the household took advantage of the current taxsystem's—3--
deductions, exemptions, and exclusions. The changes in tax liabi-
lity would affect people in the same income group differently.
For example, a disallowance of the interest paid deduction would
affect homeowners more severely than renters. Whether such
"horizontal" changes in tax burden are desirable depends to some
extent on whether the current system of preferences is judged to
be desirable.
The changes in tax liability would also depend systematically
on the income level of the household. Depending on the parameters
of the flat—rate tax system, the burden of raiing revenue could
be shifted from higher—income to lower-income households, from
both higher—income and lower—income households to the middle
class, or according to some other pattern. As was true for hori-
zontal changes in tax burden, one's judgment on these "vertical"
changes in the distribution of tax burdens depends on how
equitable the distribution of burdens under the replaced tax
system is seen to he.
Our approach to choosing a flat—rate income tax schedule is
to first formulate explicit objectives that a flat—rate tax might
reasonably be designed to meet. The next step uses an optimiza-
tion algorithm to calculate the flat—rate schedule which comes
closest to meeting the objectives, subject to the constraint that
it raise the same revenue as the current income tax system. The
calculations are carried out using a sample of 947 tax returns
randomly drawn frpm the Treasury Tax File for l977. Though the
data refer to tax year 1977, they have been updated to reproduce the
pattern of tax returns that would be filed in l982. The analysis
also uses a procedure that can apply the 1982 tax law and any
alternative tax rules, such as a flat—rate tax, to individual
records like the Treasury Tax File.5 The primary advantage of the
optimization procedure is that it finds the tax system that best
meets any particular definition of its objectives. Its principal
disadvantage is that the answers it produces are only as good as
the objectives that are proposed. The calculated optimum will
reflect the extent that certain objectives are not readily quan-
tifiable or easily comparable to other possible objectives.—4—
I. Which Flat—Rate Tax System Most Closely Approximates
the Current Distribution of Tax Burden?
One concern about a flat—rate tax system is that it might
significantly redistribute the burden of tax payments among house-
holds. Our methodology is well—suited to calculate precisely
which flat—rate tax schedule would minimize such changes in I:ax
burden.6We require an explicit expression for the degree of
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where TC and T' refer to household i's current tax liability and
liability under a flat—rate tax, .respectively. T is calculated
by using the existing tax law whileT depends on the particular
form of the flat—rate tax system to be investigated, especially
what level and what form deductions, exclusions, and exemptions
take. An alternative class of measures of the change in tax
liabilities is
(2) EQ1 (TC1 —TF.)/Y11a
where is income.
Several natural possibilities can be illustrated by—5—
expressions (1) and (2). Consider first the case where QD equals
Q1 and CL is unity. Then expression (1) is equal to QD multiplied
by the sum of the absolute values of the changes in tax liability
incurred by households due to instituting a flat—rate tax system.
Expression (2) measures the sum of the changes in the average tax
rates incurred by households. Note that when CL is one and QD equals
Q', it can be shown that the optimal flat—rate system will always
result in exactly half the taxpayers facing a tax increase end. half
facing a tax decrease. Furthermore, exactly half of the total abso-
lute deviation in total or average tax liabilities will come from tax
increases and the other half will be due to tax reductions.
Setting Q' to be greater than QD means that increases in a
household's tax liability or average tax rate are considered more
serious than decreases. In the extreme case where QD is zero, the
objective is to minimize the sum of the increases in tax liabili-
ties, or in expression (2), average tax rates. A value of CL
greater than one penalizes large changes in tax liability more
than proportionately greater than small changes. For example, if CL
is two and QD is zero,expression (1) implies that a situation
where a household faces a tax increase of $200 should be con-
sidered four times as serious as a case where a household is faced
with a $100 tax increase.
Given a particular form of expression (1) or (2), the opti—
mizing procedure finds the flat—rate tax system parameters that
minimize the objective function while at the same time raising the
same amount of revenue that would have been raised in 1982 under
the current income tax system.7 We have to specify the class
of flat—rate tax systems we want to optimize over. The three
general forms we consider are
(3) TF =max(—a —bX1+tYj ,0)—6—
(4) TF =max(—a +tY•
,0)
1 1
(5) T =max(—bX. +tY• ,0) 1 1
whereXj refers to the number of personal exemptions currently
allowed to the taxpaying unit and Yj is a measure of income. Form
(3) allows a credit of value a to each taxpaying unit, plus an
additional credit of b for each exemption. The flat—rate tax
represented by (4) eliminates the per—exemption credit, allowing
only a credit for each taxpaying unite Type (5) does away with
the per—unit credit, leaving only a credit for each exemption.
This latter system has the advantage of completely eliminating any
marriage tax or subsidy, since the value of the exemptions are the
same regardless of whether one or two returns are filed. Although
these three systems feature credits, they are exactly equivalent
to systems which have deductions and exemptions from taxable
income. For example, the tax liability under system (3) can also
be written as rnax{ t(Y —(a+bX)/t),O} In all cases the
equivalent deduction can be obtained by dividing the credit by t.
The tax liability is zero until a break—even level of income is
reached, which is..(a +bX)/tin system (3), a/t in system (4),
and bX/t in system (5). Once the break—even level is reached,
all income is taxed at rate t.
Most flat—rate tax proposals include a broadening of the tax
base, though they differ on the extent of the broadening. In
these exercises we consider two possible tax bases, adjusted gross
income and what we call extended income, which is adjusted gross
income plus the adjustments to income and the excluded portion of
realized capital gains.
Each optimization exercise must specify a specific objective
function to minimize and a specific flat—rate tax system, which
includes a choice of form (3), (4), or (5) and one of two defini——7—
tions of the tax base. Because there are somany possible com-
binations of assumptions, we have chosen to concentrate our
attention on the cases where cis one and Q equals QD• For con-
venience we set Q1 to be one. Thus wefindthe flat—rate tax
schedule which minimizes either the sum of the changes in the tax
liabilities or else the sum of changes in average tax rates. With
two different targets, three different flat—rate systems, and two
bases, there are twelve different optimization problems. An
example of the exact problem that is solved is
Minimize ITC —max(—a —bX1+tYj ,
a,b ,t
subjectto =max(— a —bX+ty,0)
The results of several of these optimizations are presented
in Table 1.Except for case 8, which we will discuss later, the
flat—rate schedule which minimizes changes incurrenttax burdens
has a marginal rate between 0.204 and 0.254, regardless of the
minimand definition, type of flat—rate system, or tax base. The
zero—tax level of income does vary somewhat for different systems,
depending on the number of allowable exemptions. For example, a
family of four with no special exemptions has a zero—tax income
level of $11,417 in Case 1, $7,318 in Case 3, and $11,900 in
Case 4.In Cases 1 and 4 the zero—tax level increases with family
size, so it favors large families; the system of Case 3, with a
$7,318 zero—tax income level for all taxpaying units favors single
households and small families.
The effect of expanding the tax base can be seen by comparing
Case 1 with Case 2.A large part of the additional base in
extended income is the excluded part of realized capital gains,
which accrue disproportionately to upper—income households.
With an expanded base, the optimal tax table is apparently less
progressive, featuring a lower marginal tax rate.—8--
A comparison of Cases 1, 3, and 4 and also Cases 5, 6, and 7
highlights the relevance of the tax system chosen. Flat—rate
system (3), which al1ows both a credit for each taxpayingunit and
a credit for each allowable exemption dominates either system(4)
or system (5), which have one credit or the other, in termsof
minimizing changes in tax burden. This should not be surprising,
because system (3) has three instruments compared to two for the
other systems. If one had to choose between a credit per tax—
paying unit or a credit per exemption, the results of Table 1
offer ambiguous counsel. If the minimand is the sum of absolute
deviations, then the credit per exemption is superior to the cre-
dit per taxpaying unit (compare Cases 3 and 4).If, however, the
minimand is the sum of deviations of tax rates, then the credit
per taxpaying unit is slightly superior (compare Cases6 and 7).
Finally, by comparing Case 1 with. Case 5, Case 3 with Case 6,
and Case 4 with Case 7, we can assess the impact of different
definitions of the changes in tax burden resulting from insti-
tuting a flat—rate income tax.8 In the first two situations,
measuring the change in tax burdens using average tax rates
instead of absolute tax liabilities implies that the optimal sche-
dule is less progressive; in the third case, it is slightly more
progressive. In no. case does the optimal marginal income tax rate
change more than 0.032 when the minimand changes. Thisrelative
insensitivity to the choice of target definition does not apply
generally, as Case 8 makes clear. If the measure of tax burden
changes is the sum of squared differences in tax liability(c2),
then the best flat—rate system in the case of system (3) with a tax
base of ACT is characterized by a marginal tax rate of 0.382.
The much higher rate results because this measure of tax changes
penalizes the large reductions in tax liability that many high—
income individuals would get. Thus the optimal flat—rate tax in
this case is more successful in reproducing the current tax liabi-
lities of the high—income taxpayers, which requires a more
progressive flat-rate tax.
Just looking at the sum of the absolute or squared deviations
from current tax burdens does not tell us how the tax burden changes—9—
are distributed through the population. To see this, we must look
at a disaggregated breakdown of tax liabilities. As anexample,
we will focus on Case 1 of Table 1. This exercise finds the flat—
rate tax system with both a unit credit and a creditper exemption,
which uses AGI as the tax base, and which minimizes thesum of
absolute deviations in tax liabilities. The best such schedule has
a credit per taxpaying unit of $944, a credit per exemption of $489,
and a marginal tax rate of 0.254.
Table 2 shows the changes in the average tax rate that would
result from shifting to this flat—rate tax schedule, arranged by
ACI class.9 Each cell is the fraction of the taxpaying units in
the ACI class that would experience a particular change in their
average tax rate. First of all, notice that fifty—two percent of
all taxpaying units would have a minimal change in theiraverage
tax liability, meaning no more than a two percentage point change
one way or the other. The percentage of households that benefit
significantly (a decrease of more than two percentage points) is
relatively small for the lowest income group, because most households
in this group don't pay much tax under either taxsystem. From
then on the percentage of significant gainers is U—shaped: forty—
seven percent of the $5,000— $10,000 class gain significantly,
twenty—six percent of the $10,000 —$15,000group gain signifi--
cantly, but less than ten percent in the $20,000 —$40,000groups
would find their average tax rates reduced by more than twoper-
centage points. The number of significant gainers increases to
fifteen percent in the $40,000— $50,000 class, forty—fivepercent
in the $50,000— $100,000 class, eighty—six percent of the $100,000
—$200,000class, and peaks at ninety percent of the over $200,000
class. Conversely, the percentage of households which would
experience significant increases in tax burden has an inverted U
shape, peaking a fifty—eight percent in the $25,000 —$30,000
group, and being low at either end of the income spectrum. Notice,
though, that there is a significant amount.of dispersion in the
impact of a flat—rate tax within income classes. For example in
the $50,000 —$100,000group, twenty—one percent of the households
would experience a reduction of five percent or more in their—10—
TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF OPTIMAL FLAT—RATE INCOME TAXSCHEDULES
Efficiency
Form of Flat—Rate Tax a b Value of Cost**
CaseMinimandSystem Base Cs) ($) t Minimand*($billions)
1 1 3 A.G.I. 944 489 .254 61.6 19.6
2 1 3 E.I. 886 424 .236 67.2 16.9
3 1 4 A.C.I. 1705 .233 78.7 i66
4 1 5 A.G.I. 712 .239 73.1 17.6
5 2 3 A.G.I. 802 429 .242 2.21 18.0
6 2 4 A,G.I. 991 .204 2.93 13.1
7 2 5 A.G.I. 771 .244 3.06 18.5
8 1' 3 A.G.I. 30991077 .382 948329. 39.1
Form of Miniinand:1. E IT —TI 1 1
1'.(T —T')2 1 1
C F
T. T. 2. E 1—1
IY. Y.
-I
Flat—RateSystem: 3. Tax =Max ( —a—bX.+ tY. ,0)
4. Tax =Max (—a+tY1
,0)
5. Tax =Max ( —bX.+ tY. ,0)
1 1
TaxBase: A.G.I.; adjusted gross income
E.I.; extended income (defined in text)
*Theunit of measurement for Cases 1—4 is billions of dollars,for
Cases 5—7 it is millions, and for Case 8 isbillions of dollars squared.






























DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN AVERAGE TAX LIABILITY DUE TO
CHANGING TO A FLAT-RATE INCOHE TAX SYSTEM -- BYTNCOME CLASS
Change in Average Tax Rate
(Tax Liability Divided by Ad) Number Decreases in Tax Increases in Tax of Less -.15-.10 -.05 -.02 +.02 +.05 +.1O+,15+.20 More Returnsthantototototototototothan (Millions) -.20-.20 -.15 -.10-.05 -.02+,02 +.05 +.10 +.15 +.20
.000 .001 .002 .023 .148 .729 .006 .086 .004 .000.001
.000 .003 .009 .130 .332 .456 .032 .039. .000 .000 .000
.001 .000 .012 .046 .201 .636 .062 .027 .015 .000 .000
.000 .000 .006 .041 .079 .556 .221 .073 .022 .002.000
.000.000 .001 .013 .051 .442 .364 .109 .012 .005 .002
.000 .000 .001 .012 .020 .393 .403 .159 .013 .001.000
.000 .000 .005 .013 .065 .412 .327 .166 .009 .002.001
.000 .000 .003 .028 .120 .468 .255 .115 .007 .002 .002
.003 .005 .029 .173 .235 .355 .131 .047 .013 .003 .005
.034 .104 .298 .323 .104 .051 .026 .020 .015 .008 .016
.175 .346 .251 .099 .032 .026 .027 .016 .011 .006 .012
.001 .002 .009 .052 .150 .523 .167 .086 .010 .001 .001—12--
average tax rates, while at the same time more thansix percent
would have an increase in their tax rate of more than five percent.
The dispersion is due to the fact that the high income households
differ substantially in the amount of deductions they take. Thus
while for a given income class the average tax rate on taxable
income does not vary much under the current system, the average tax
rate as a fraction of adjusted gross income does vary quite abit.
In this case switching to a system where the fraction of AGI that
tax liability comprises isvirtually fixed hurts some households
and helps others.
In Table 3, the distribution of the change in average tax
liability is again shown, but this time the rows group households
according to their average tax rate under the current system. The
large majority of households are situated along the diagonal
running from top right to lower left. What this implies is that
people who were paying low average tax rates tend to face higher
taxes under the flat system, and those who were paying high
average tax rates receive a tax reduction. Comparisonof Tables 2
and 3 suggests that the proper interpretation of the redistributional
impact of switching to a flat—rate tax depends on how onedefines
rich and poor. As •Table 3 shows, if by rich we mean those that
currently pay high tax rates as a fraction of AGI, then aflat—
rate tax substantially reduces the tax paid by the richin an
unambiguous manner. Table 2 makes clear, though, that amongthose
with high AOl, there is significant dispersion in the average rate
of tax paid, due to greatly varying use of deductions. IfAGI is
the index of income, then the rich still tend to gain under a
flat—rate tax, but not to the universal extent that Table3 would
indicate. 10
Table 4 presents the disaggregated breakdown of how marginal
tax rates are changed by switching to the flat—rate taxof Case 1.
There are only two possible marginal tax rates under the flat—rate
tax:zero, if one's credits are sufficient tooffset any tax
liability on income, or the one positive marginal rate,which in
this case is 0.254. Because the credits under the flat—rate systemTABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OFCHANGES IN AVERAGE TAX LIABILITY DUE TO CHANGING
TO A FLAT-RATE INCOME TAX SYSTEM --BYCURRENT AVERAGE TAX RATE
Change inAverage Tax Rate
(TaxLiability Divided by AOl)
Decreasesin Tax Increases in Tax
Less -.15-.10-.05 -.02 +.02 +.05 +,1O +.15 +.2O More
than to to to to to to to to tothan
-.20-.20 -.15-.10 -.05 -.02 +.02 +.05 +.1O +.15 +.20















.000 .000 .000 .000 .239 .605 .031 .097 .020 .005 .004
.000 .000 .000 .139 .235 .399 .103 .108017 .001 .000
.000 .000 .012 .016 .017 .490 .334 .129 .002 .000 .000
.000 .003 .003 .020 .024 .648 .289 .011 .000 .000 .000
.000 .000 .003 .046.328.619 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000
.001 .000 .004 .544 .447 .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.000 .005 .385 .611 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.056 .180 .763 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.628 .372 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.001 .002 .009 .052 .150 .523 .167 .086 .010 .001 .001—14—
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF CHANGES IN 1.LA.RGINAL TAX LIABILITY DUE TO
CHANCING TO A FLAT--RATE INCOI TAX SYSTE-I --BYINCO CLASS
Changein Marginal Tax Rate
Adjusted Number Decreases in Tax_ 1SeS1nTax
Gross of Less -.15-.10-.05-.02+.02 +.05 +.1O +.15 +.20 More
Income Returns thanto to to to to to to to tothen
($1000) (Millions)
-.20-.20 -.15 .10-.05-.02+.02 +,05 +10 +15 +.20
0 -5 16.7 .000 .000 .258 .007 .016 .622 .004 .089.004 .000 .000
5- 10 14.5 .104 .070 .191 .006 .022 .068 .000 .481 .053.000 .005
10 -15 12.2 .000 .008 .102 .000 .002 .017 .281 .548 .029.000 .011
15 -20 9.4 .000 .011 .003 .042 .016 .201 .252 .436 .025.003 .011
20 -25 8.4 .000 .003 .019 .224 .056 .169 .387 .119 .011.002 .009
25 -30 7.9 .000 .003 .022 .159 .226 .416 .132 .034 .003.002 .000
30 -40 10.4 .006 .022 .100 .261.437 .129 .030 .014 .000 .001 .000
40 -50 4.9 .032 .041 .560 .269 .082 .008 .003 .001 .000.003 .000
50 -100 4.4 .492 .187 .280 .027 .006 .001 .001 .001 .000.004 .001
100-200 0.65 .953 .011 .004 .001 .002 .018 .002 .004.000 .002 .002
More than 200 0.16 .941 .004 .003 .011 .002 .023 .000 .001 .000.011 .004
TcYIAL 89.5 .052 .026 .153 .088 .089 .219 .117 .231 .017.001 .005—15—
are more generous than under the current tax system, substantial
numbers of taxpayers would find their marginal tax rate reduced (to
zero) under a flat—rate system. However, since the marginal rate
of 0.254 is higher than the rate currently applicable tomany low—
income taxpayers, many others would find their marginal rate to be
increased. The bottom row of Table 4 indicates that abouttwenty—
two percent of all taxpayers would experience a small (between
+0.02 and —0.02) change in marginal tax rates. Of those that
would experience a significant change in their marginal tax rate,
about half (forty—one percent overall) would have a decline, and
half (thirty—seven percent overall) would see an increase. The
U—shaped distributional pattern is evident here as it was in
Table 2.It is the middle income groups that for the most part
would face higher marginal rates. Many with very low income and
the majority of high income taxpayers would face a lower marginal
tax rate.
It is worth emphasizing that these changes in the vertical
distribution of tax liabilities occur even though the flat—rate
system under study is the best one that can be designed in terms of
minimizing the particular definition of tax burden changes. Thus
they are not the result of an imprecise choice of the flat—rate
system's parameters Of course, a new minimand could be designed
that would include a measure of the redistribution of the tax bur-
dens among broadly defined income groups. Given the constraints of
the flat—rate system, though, it is not clear in which direction
this would change the optimal flat—rate parameters.
All of the optimization exercises discussed so farhave been
done with the implicit assumption that there is no behavioral
response caused by the change to a flat—rate tax. If, however, the
change was accompanied by a large increase in labor supply, for
example, then the increased tax base would make possible either a
lower marginal tax rate or higher credits (or both) than these exer-
cises indicated. The results presented in Table 4, though, indi-
cate that the magnitude of any induced behavioral response may be
very small because there are as many households who would face a
higher marginal tax rate as would face a lower one. To check that—16—
impression, we performed the following simple calculation. Assume
that labor supply responds only to its net—of—tax price, and that
the wage rate does not adjust when the tax system changes. Assume
also that the (uncompensated) elasticity of response of labor
supply is 0.2. Given these assumptions we can approximate the per-
centage increase in labor income due to switching to aflat—rate
tax system as one hundred times






where W refers to the. ith person's current labor income, and t 1 ml
andt'.arethe marginal tax rates on labor income under a flat—
in]-
ratesystem and the current tax system, respectively.For the
flat—rate tax system of Case 1, expression (6) equals 0.0186.That
is, only a 1.9 percent increase in labor income couldbe expected.
The expected increases for the other flat—rate systems are also not
large. For this reason, we have chosen not to incorporatebeha-
vioral responses directly into the optimizations. However, evenin
the absence of large behavioral response the efficiency implica-
tions of changing marginal tax rates may be significant.In
Section II we explicitly introduce efficiency into our optimization
exercises.
II. Which Flat—Rate Tax System Best Balances EfficiencyCosts
With Minimal Changes in the Distribution of Tax Burdens?
In principle, if we can write down an expression for the
value of the incentive effects of the tax system, we couldcalcu-
late the flat—rate tax system which is best in this regard.More—17—
generally, we could construct an objective function whichplaced
value on the incentive effects of the tax andthe amount of tax
burden redistribution that was caused.Considering both objec-
tives simply requires an evaluation of therelativeimportance of
meeting them.
Valuing the effects of changed incentives is notstraightfor-
ward. Increased saving implies lesscurrent consumption, and
increased labor supply entails less leisure.The gain to the eco-
nomy of greater work effort and savings is properly measuredas
net of the value of the alternative activity, be itcurrent con-
sumption or leisure. However, in thepresence of nonlumpsum
taxes, the social value of additional units of taxed commodities
will not equal the socialopportunity cost of producing additional
units of the good. Thus the availableresources are being used
inefficiently. If we ignore savings distortions for themoment, a
well—known approximation of the value of theefficiency loss due
to taxing labor income is
(7) 1()s1t1w1
whereis the compensated elasticity of laborsupply with respect
to the after—tax wage, tisthe marginal tax rate, and W is labor
income.
It is possible to derive an expression similar to (7) which
accounts for the welfare loss caused by the taxation of capital
income (see, for example, Feldstein (1978)).However, there is
considerable controversy about what are the appropriatesubstitution.
terms that enter the expression, and even theproper model within
which to calculate this loss (Summers (1981)).Moreover, because the
taxation of capital income is so complex, the appropriate valueof the
marginal tax rate to use in such a calculation is problematic. The
effective tax rate on capital gains differs from thaton dividends,—18--
which differs from that on capital income accumulated in an IRA,
and so on. In order to avoid these measurement problems, and not
because we believe the welfare costs are relatively small, we have
chosen not to consider any distortions other than those concerning
labor supply.
Clearly the welfare loss of expression (7) depends critically
on the compensated labor supply elasticity. Econometric estimates
of labor supply responsiveness have by no means been unanimous. A
review of the literature by Borjas and }leckman (1978) put bounds
of —0.19 and —0.07 on the uncompensated elasticity of male labor
supply. Killingsworth (1982) determines that estimates for the
uncocipensated elasticity of female labor supply lie between +0.20
and +0.90. These estimates for uncompensated elasticities
underestimate the compensated elasticity due to the fact that the
income effect on labor supply is negative. On the basis of this
evidence, we have chosen to do all the subsequent calculations
with a value ofof 0.4, which is meant to be a weighted average
of the compensated elasticities implied by the econometric
estimates of uncoinperisated elasticicies of males and females.'1
Given a particular value of c ,wecan calculate the approxi-
mate efficiency loss for any flat—rate tax system. In principle,
then, we can proceed by solving one of the following optimization
problems:
(8) Mm E IT —TI+P1(()€'t2.W.) s.t.
i I I I
or
(9) Mm E IT/Y1 — + 2(E(4)ct12w1)s.t. T =
HereP1 and P2 refer to the relative weight the policymaker
places on the efficiency/incentive effects of the tax system vis——19—
a—vis the measure of tax burden changes) asdefinedearlier.
Setting P to zero corresponds to the case where the policy—maker
has no interest inthe efficiency implications of the tax system.
Clearlythen the best flat—rate tax is found as in Section I.If
P is very large, then the only consideration thepolicy—maker has
isthe incentive effects of the income tax system; approximating
the status distribution is not a concern. In this case the
optimal flat—rate tax features a marginal tax rate of zero. All
revenue is raised from lump—sum taxes.
In the general case when P lies between zero and infinity the
best flat—rate income tax schedule is a compromise between the two
policy goals of minimizing changes in the current distribution of
taxes and minimizing the efficiency costs of the tax system. By
finding the optimal tax schedule for each of various values of P
we can trace out the frontier which represents how well a par-
ticular flat—rate tax system can achieve its two goals. In Figure
1 we have drawn the frontier for the flat—rate system of Case 1.
On the vertical axi.s is the measure of how much change in the
distribution of tax burdens occurs. Along the horizontal axis is
the measure of efficiency cost, or excess burden, developed
earlier; this measure depends on the assumption that the compen-
sated elasticity of labor supply is 0.4.
In Section I we assumed that the sole concern in choosing a
flat—rate tax system was in minimizing the change in tax burdens
In the context o Figure 1, we determined the point A. From the
last column of Table 1 we can see that this system has an effi-
ciency cost of $19.6 billion and a sum of absolute tax burden
changes of $61.6 billion.'2 Another point of interest is F,which
has zero efficiency cost and thus features a zero marginal income
tax rate. If the credit per taxpaying unit and credit per exemp-
tion level are chosen to minimize the sum of the absolute changes
in tax burden, a =—$3,238,b =$19,and the change sums to $276.7
billion, or about four and a half times as large as for point A.
This is obviously not a feasible (or, of course, equitable) tax
system, since it implies that a family of four with no special
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0 944 489 .254 61.6 19.6
.5 689 308 .225- 67.3 15.8
1 537 115 .198 81.9 12.4
1.5 255 -83 .162 107.7 •8.4
2 158 -178 .146 120.9 6.9
-3238 19 .000 276.7 0.0—22—
families will not be able to afford to pay this levy. Table 5
lists the optimal tax schedule for other non—extreme values of P1.
By plotting the values of the last two columns onto Figure 1 ,we
trace out the frontier we can achieve with this kind of flat—rate
tax. The slope of the frontier indicates the tradeoff between the
two goals that policy—makers face in their choice of a tax sche-
dule. For example, in the region between points C and D,
decreasing the efficiency cost by $1 billion must cost $6.4
billion in additional divergence from current tax burdens, as
measured by the sum of absolute differences.
Note that the frontier of Figure 1 refers to a particular
flat—rate system, tax base, and measure of tax liability changes.
If we considered another system such as one with only a per tax-
paying unit credit, the frontier would lie entirely above the one
in Figure 1, since any one credit tax system is a special case of
the system of type (3), and thus can always be at least equalled
in meeting the objectives. The frontier for another tax base such
as gross income may intersect the frontier of Figure 1.In this
case the choice of tax base depends on where on the frontier the
policy—maker chooses to be. The frontier for a different measure
of tax liability changes, such as the sum of squared differences in
tax liability, is not directly comparable to Figure 1 because the
unit of measurement along the vertical axis is different. The
point analogous to point A is characterized in the last row of
Table 1; it featuies a marginal tax rate of 0.382 and an efficiency
cost of $39.1 billion. The optimal marginal tax rate declines from
0,382 to zero as the weight placed on efficiency cost increases.
III. Concluding Remarks
In this section we assess two aspects of this research: the
value of the optimization technique to the analysis of taxation,
and the choice of the best flat—rate tax to implement, should one—23—
be desired. These two assessments must of necessity be related ——
ourconclusions about the flat—rate tax are worthwhile only to the
extent that our methodology is judged to be insightful.
The main advantages of the optimization technique are (i)
that it focuses attention on the objectives the tax system is
aimed at achieving, and (ii) that it gives specific answers about
the optimal tax system designed to meet any formulation of these
objectives. This is especially valuable when the objectives can
be meaningfully translated into an explicit target function.
Thus, in Section I, when several natural alternative definitions
of approximating the current income tax distribution exist, the
procedure is particularly insightful. In Section II, where the
relative weights to be placed on the objectives do not have as
natural an interpretation, not as much insight is gained. In this
case the procedure still can serve to present the tradeoffs among
objectives that are available to the policy—maker. For example,
the results of Section II indicate what cost in terms of effi-
ciency loss must result from trying to reduce the changes in the
distribution of tax burdens.
What has the application of this technique taught us about
the choice of a flat—rate income tax schedule? Section I showed
that, if one desired characteristic of a flat—rate tax is to
approximate the current distribution of tax burdens, and if the
sum of changes in household tax burdens is the measure of how
close the flat—rate tax comes to the current system, then the best
flat—rate tax features marginal tax rates between 0.204 and 0.254.
In particular, a schedule with (approximately) a $1,000 non—
refundable credit per taxpaying unit, a $500 credit per exemption,
and a marginal tax rate of twenty—five percent applied to all of
adjusted gross income with no deductions will raise the same
amount of revenue as the current tax system with minimal changes
in tax burden. This minimal amount of change in tax burdens
amounts to $61.6 billion, or about $688 per taxpaying unit.
Moreover, the distribution of tax liability changes is systemati-
cally related to current income, with upper—income households
paying less tax and middle—income households paying more tax.If—24—
the measure of how close a flat—rate tax comes to the current
distribution of taxes is the sum of squared changes in tax liabi-
lity, then the best marginal tax rate should be as high as 0.382.
In this case, the flat—rate tax schedule is chosen with more
attention to matching the current tax liabilities of the high
income households.
When another objective is minimizing the efficiency costs of
the tax system, the best flat—rate schedule optimally balances the
efficiency cost with the change in tax burdens. For any given
type of system, choice of tax base, and measure of changein tax
burdens, the optimization technique allows us to construct the
efficient fontier in the space of the two objectives. The best
flat—rate tax depends on the relative weights assigned to the two
objectives. Using this frontier we can calculate the tradeoff
between conflicting policy goals the choice of a fiat—rate tax
must confront.
One of the virtues of the optimization technique used here is
that the procedure uses the detailed microunit information on
income by source, deductions, exemptions, and so on. Thus it is a
significant improvement over the analytical treatments which use
highly simplified assumptions about the distributions of the
variables. However, even the microunit information does not allow
investigation of certain issues of interest. First, it is a
cross—section of observations in a given year. As such it is not
helpful in assessing the implications for the distribution of
lifetime tax burdens of a particular change. If fluctuations in
annual income are large, then a flat—rate tax may approximate
current lifetime tax burdens more closely than a cross—section
would indicate. Second, it does not contain information on some
types of income, such as interest from state andlocal securities,
which may be taxable under a comprehensive flat—rate tax system.
The optimal flat—rate schedule which also included this income
in its tax base might look different than the schedules calculated
in this paper.
Throughout this paper we have assumed that one desideratum to
be considered in the choice of a flat—rate tax is minimal changes—25--
in current tax burdens. Of course, the optimizationtechnique is
general enough to also consider a problem in optimal tax design,
where the current distribution of taxes is irrelevant and the
societal standards of equity are considered in the form ofthe
social welfare function. In this case the choice of theoptimal
flat—rate tax involves trading off equity and efficiency. Wehope
to consider this problem in future research.Footnotes
1. For example, see Sheshinski (1972),Atkinson(1973), and
Phelps (1973).
2. See Feldstein (1976) for a discussion of taxreform versus
taxdesign.
3.The Treasury Tax File is a stratified random sampleof over
100,000 individual tax returns. Because thesampling weights are
known, the individual records can be used tomake estimates for
the population of taxpayers. 'See Feldstein andFrisch (1977).
4.The updating is accomplished by multiplyingall amounts by
1.52 and by increasing the number of taxpayingunits by a factor
of 1.02.
5.The 1982 tax law used in the calculations takesaccount of
only the major differences from the1981 law. Specifically, all
tax rates are reduced by ten percent,and the top marginal tax
rate is reduced to fifty percent.
6.This tax sc1èdule is of interest if, for example,the reason
for implementing a flat—rate tax is to achieve
administrative/Compliance cost savings, which do not dependott the
particular flat—rate schedule chosen.The policy—maker wants to
achieve these savings while incurring a minimumof tax burden
red is tr ibu tion.
7. With the aging procedure discussed in note4 and the tax law
as presented in note 5, we calculatethat revenues from the indi-
vidual income tax in 1982 would be $295 billion.
8.The optimizatiOns of Cases 5, 6, and 7 werecarried outexcluding households with adjusted gross income of less than
$1,000. This was done because small changes in tax liability to
these households can represent huge changes in tax paidas a frac—
tion of income, and thus can unreasonably dominate themeasure of
tax burden changes. By excluding them from the optimization
sample we insure that the optimal flat—rate system approximates
the current distribution of tax burdens throughout the wholerange
of incomes and not just for those withvery low incomes.
9.The disaggregated information in Tables 2, 3, and 4 is based
on the over 25,000 records of the Treasury Tax File. As men-
tioned earlier the optimizations were performedon a subsample of
947 records. Tables 2, 3, and 4 computed using the smallersample
yielded qualitatively similar results to those reported, but featured
some irregularities due to small sample size of some cells.
10. Feldstein and Taylor (1976) present detailed.evidence of the
dispersion of marginal tax rates within income classes.
11. The elasticity of 0.2 used in Section I to estimate beha—
vioral response represents an uncompensated elasticity.
12.It is interesting to compare these figures to the current tax
system, which has an efficiency cost of $32.7 billion and a sum of
absolute tax burden changes equal to, of course, zero. Note that
all the flat—rate tax systems lie to the northwest of the current
system of Figure 1.If reducing the efficiency cost of the tax
system were the only reason for implementing a flat—rate tax and
the redistribution of tax burdens its only disadvantage, the
policy—maker must decide whether $13.1 billion in efficiency cost
reduction is worth $61.6 billion in tax liability changes,
(assuming Case 1 is the flat—rate tax option). Of course, these
are not the only considerations in the decision of whether to
switch to a flat—rate tax. ,References
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